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HIGH TECHNOLOGY, CONSUMER PRIVACY,  
AND U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY 
Laura K. Donohue* 
 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Documents released over the past year detailing the National Security Agency’s 
(“NSA”) telephony metadata collection program and interception of international 
content under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) implicated U.S. 
high technology companies in government surveillance. 1   The result was an 
immediate, and detrimental, impact on U.S. corporations, the economy, and U.S. 
national security. 
The first Snowden documents, printed on June 5, 2013, revealed that the 
government had served orders on Verizon, directing the company to turn over 
telephony metadata under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act.2  The following 
day, The Guardian published classified slides detailing how the NSA had 
intercepted international content under Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act.3  
The type of information obtained ranged from E-mail, video and voice chat, 
videos, photos, and stored data, to Voice over Internet Protocol, file transfers, 
video conferencing, notifications of target activity, and online social networking.4  
The companies involved read like a who’s who of U.S. Internet giants:  Microsoft, 
Yahoo, Google, Facebook, PalTalk, YouTube, Skype, AOL, and Apple.5   
* Professor of Law, Georgetown Law and Director, Center on National Security and the Law, 
Georgetown Law.  Special thanks to David Vladeck for his comments on an earlier draft of this 
Article, and to Ellen Noble and Morgan Stoddard for their excellent research assistance.  This Article 
draws in part from written testimony prepared for the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on 
Energy and commerce, Subcommittee on Commerce, Manufacturing, and Trade, for the hearing 
“Cross Border Data Flows:  Could Foreign Protectionism Hurt U.S. Jobs?” Sept. 17, 2014. 
1 See, e.g., Glenn Greenwald and Ewen MacAskill, NSA Prism Program Taps in to User Data of 
Apple, Google, and Others, THE GUARDIAN (June 7, 2013, 3:23 PM), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/us-tech-giants-nsa-data; Barton Gellman and Laura 
Poitras, U.S., British Intelligence Mining Data from Nine U.S. Internet Companies in Broad Secret 
Program, WASH. POST (June 7, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/us-
intelligence-mining-data-from-nine-us-internet-companies-in-broad-secret-
program/2013/06/06/3a0c0da8-cebf-11e2-8845-d970ccb04497_story.html?hpid=z1; Glenn 
Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of Verizon Customers Daily, THE GUARDIAN, 
(June 6, 2013, 8:05 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-
court-order [herenafter Greenwald, NSA Collected Verizon Records]; Glenn Greenwald, Microsoft 
Handed the NSA Access to Encrypted Messages, THE GUARDIAN, (July 12, 2013, 5:04 PM), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/11/microsoft-nsa-collaboration-user-data; Barton 
Gellman & Ashkan Soltani, NSA Infiltrates Links to Yahoo, Google Data Centers Worldwide, 
Snowden Documents Say, WASH. POST, Oct. 30, 2013, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-infiltrates-links-to-yahoo-google-data-
centers-worldwide-snowden-documents-say/2013/10/30/e51d661e-4166-11c3-8b74-
d89d714ca4dd_story.html.  For statutory and constitutional analysis of the telephony metadata 
program and the interception of international content, see Laura K. Donohue, Bulk Metadata 
Collection:  Statutory and Constitutional Considerations, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 757 (2014) 
[hereinafter Donohue, Bulk Metadata Collection],; Laura K. Donohue, Section 702 and the 
Collection of International Telephone and Internet Content, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y, 
(forthcoming 2015) [hereinafter Donohue, Section 702).  
2 Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records, supra note 1.  
3 Greenwald & MacAskill, supra note 1. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
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More articles highlighting the extent to which the NSA had become embedded 
in the U.S. high tech industry followed.  In September 2013 ProPublica and the 
New York Times revealed that the NSA had enjoyed considerable success in 
cracking commonly used cryptography.6  The following month the Washington 
Post reported that the NSA, without the consent of the companies involved, had 
obtained millions of customers’ address book data.  In one day alone, some 
444,743 email addresses from Yahoo, 105,068 from Hotmail, 82,857 from 
Facebook, 33,697 from Gmail, and 22,881 from other providers.7   
The extent of upstream collection stunned the public, as did slides 
demonstrating how the NSA had bypassed the companies’ encryption, intercepting 
data as it transferred between the public Internet and the Google cloud. 8  
Documents further suggested that the NSA had helped to promote encryption 
standards for which it already held the key or whose vulnerabilities the agency 
understood but had not taken steps to address.9   
Beyond this, press reports indicated that the NSA had at times posed as U.S. 
companies—without their knowledge—in order to gain access to foreign targets.  
In November 2013 Der Spiegel reported that the NSA and the United Kingdom’s 
Government Communications Headquarters (“GCHQ”) had created bogus versions 
of Slashdot and LinkedIn, so that when employees from the telecommunications 
firm Belgacom tried to access the sites from corporate computers, their requests 
were diverted to the replica sites that then injected malware into their machines.10 
As a result of the growing public awareness of these programs, U.S. companies 
have lost revenues, even as non-U.S. firms have benefited. 11   In addition, 
6 Nicole Perlroth, et al., N.S.A. Able to Foil Basic Safeguards of Privacy on Web, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 
2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/06/us/nsa-foils-much-internet-
encryption.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
7 Barton Gellman & Ashkan Soltani, NSA Collects Millions of E-mail Address Books Globally, 
WASH. POST, Oct. 14, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-collects-
millions-of-e-mail-address-books-globally/2013/10/14/8e58b5be-34f9-11e3-80c6-
7e6dd8d22d8f_story.html. 
8 Gellman & Soltani, supra note 1. 
9 James Ball, et al., Revealed:  How US and UK Spy Agencies Defeat Internet Privacy and Security, 
THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 6, 2013, 8:24 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-gchq-
encryption-codes-security. 
10 Steven Levy, How the NSA Almost Killed the Internet, WIRED (Jan. 7, 2014, 6:30 AM), 
http://www.wired.com/2014/01/how-the-us-almost-killed-the-internet/all/. 
11 See, e.g., Sam Gustin, NSA Spying Scandal Could Cost U.S. Tech Giants Billions, TIME (Dec. 10, 
2013), http://business.time.com/2013/12/10/nsa-spying-scandal-could-cost-u-s-tech-giants-billions/  
(“The National Security Agency spying scandal could cost the top U.S. tech companies billions of 
dollars over the next several years, according to industry experts.  In addition to consumer Internet 
companies, hardware and cloud-storage giants like IBM, Hewlett-Packard, and Oracle could suffer 
billions of dollars in losses.”); Ellen Messmer, U.S. High-Tech Industry Feeling the Heat from 
Edward Snowden Leaks, NETWORKWORLD, (July 19, 2013, 3:44 PM), 
http://www.networkworld.com/article/2168328/security/u-s--high-tech-industry-feeling-the-heat-
from-edward-snowden-leaks.html (“The disclosures about the National Security Agency’s massive 
global surveillance by Edward Snowden, the former information-technology contractor who’s now 
wanted by the U.S. government for treason, is hitting the U.S. high-tech industry hard as it tries to 
explain its involvement in the NSA data-collection program.”); Claire Cain Miller, Revelations of 
N.S.A. Spying Cost U.S. Tech Companies, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2014, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/22/business/fallout-from-snowden-hurting-bottom-line-of-tech-
companies.html?_r=0  (writing, “Despite the tech companies’ assertions that they provide 
information on their customers only when required under law – and not knowingly through a back 
door – the perception that they enabled the spying program has lingered.”); Surveillance Costs: The 
NSA’s Impact on the Economy, Internet Freedom & Cybersecurity, NEW AMERICA’S OPEN TECH. 
INST. 2 (July 2014), http://oti.newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/Surveilance 
_Costs_Final.pdf (“American companies have reported declining sales overseas and lost business 
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numerous countries, concerned about consumer privacy as well as the penetration 
of U.S. surveillance efforts in the economic and political spheres, have accelerated 
data localization initiatives, begun restricting U.S. companies’ access to local 
markets, and introduced new privacy protections, with implications for the future 
of Internet governance and U.S. economic growth.  These effects raise attendant 
concerns about U.S. national security.  
It could be argued that some of these effects, such as data localization 
initiatives, are merely opportunistic—i.e., other countries are merely using the 
NSA revelations to advance national commercial and political interests.12  Even if 
true, however, the NSA programs provide other countries with an opportunity.  
They have weakened the U.S. hand in the international arena. 
Congress has the ability to redress the current situation.  First, and most 
importantly, reform of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act would provide for 
greater restrictions on NSA surveillance.  Second, new domestic legislation could 
extend better protections to consumer privacy.  These shifts would allow U.S. 
industry legitimately to claim a change in circumstance, which would help them to 
gain competitive ground.  Third, the integration of economic concerns at a 
programmatic level within the national security infrastructure would help to ensure 
that economic matters remain central to national security determinations in the 
future. 
 
II.  ECONOMIC IMPACT OF NSA PROGRAMS 
 
The NSA programs, and public awareness of them, have had an immediate and 
detrimental impact on the U.S. economy.  They have cost U.S. companies billions 
of dollars in lost sales, even as companies have seen their market shares decline.  
American multinational corporations have had to develop new products and 
programs to offset the revelations and to build consumer confidence.  At the same 
time, foreign entities have seen revenues increase.  Beyond the immediate impact, 
the revelation of the programs, and the extent to which the NSA has penetrated 
foreign data flows, has undermined U.S. trade agreement negotiations.  It has 
spurred data localization efforts around the world, and it has raised the spectre of 
the future role of the United States in Internet governance.  Even if opportunistic, 
these shifts signal an immediate and long-term impact of the NSA programs, and 
public knowledge about them, on the U.S. economy. 
 
A.  Lost Revenues and Declining Market Share 
 
Billions of dollars are on the line because of worldwide concern that the 
services provided by U.S. information technology companies are neither secure nor 
private.13  Perhaps nowhere is this more apparent than in cloud computing. 
opportunities, especially as foreign companies turn claims for products that can protect users from 
NSA spying into a competitive advantage.”). 
12 See, e.g., Jonah Force Hill, The Growth of Data Localization Post-Snowden:  Analyses and 
Recommendations for U.S. Policymakers and Industry Leaders, Lawfare Research Paper Series, July 
21, 2014 (arguing that protectionism, domestic surveillance and law enforcement, control of 
information and censorship, and populist politics and anti-globalization, and not the NSA programs, 
serve as the underlying motivation). 
13 IT Industries Set to Lose Billions Because of Privacy Concerns, UNITED PRESS INT’L, (Dec. 17, 
2013, 9:20 PM), http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2013/12/17/IT-industries-
set-to-lose-billions-because-of-privacy-concerns/UPI-30251387333206/ (“Information technology 
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Previously, approximately 50% of the worldwide cloud computing revenues 
derived from the United States.14  The domestic market thrived:  between 2008 and 
2014, it more than tripled in value.15  But within weeks of the Snowden leaks, 
reports had emerged that U.S. companies such as Dropbox, Amazon Web Services, 
and Microsoft’s Azure were losing business.16  By December 2013, ten percent of 
the Cloud Security Alliance had cancelled U.S. cloud services projects as a result 
of the Snowden information.17  In January 2014 a survey of Canadian and British 
businesses found that one quarter of the respondents were moving their data 
outside the United States.18   
The Information Technology and Innovation Foundation estimates that 
declining revenues of corporations that focus on cloud computing and data storage 
alone could reach $35 billion over the next three years.19  Other commentators, 
such as Forrester Research analyst James Staten, have put actual losses as high as 
$180 billion by 2016, unless something is done to restore confidence in data held 
by U.S. companies.20   
The monetary impact of the NSA programs extends beyond cloud computing 
to the high technology industry.  Cisco, Qualcomm, IBM, Microsoft, and Hewlett-
Packard have all reported declining sales as a direct result of the NSA programs.21  
Servint, a webhosting company based in Virginia, reported in June 2014 that its 
international clients had dropped by 50% since the leaks began.22  Also in June, the 
German government announced that because of Verizon’s complicity in the NSA 
program, it would end its contract with the company, which had previously 
companies stand to lose billions of dollars of business because of concerns their services are neither 
secure nor private.”). 
14 Gartner Predict Cloud Computing Spending to Increase by 100% in 2016, Says AppsCare, PRWEB 
(July 19, 2012), http://www.prweb.com/releases/2012/7/prweb9711167.htm. 
15 Id. 
16 David Gilbert, Companies Turn to Switzerland for Cloud Storage Following NSA Spying 
Revelations, INT’L BUS. TIMES, (July 4, 2013, 2:33 PM), http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/business-turns-
away-dropbox-towards-switzerland-nsa-486613. 
17 Mieke Eoyang & Gabriel Horwitz, Op-Ed.,  NSA Snooping’s Negative Impact on Business Would 
Have the Founding Fathers ‘Aghast,’ FORBES,(Dec. 20, 2013, 8:00 AM), 
http://snewsi.com/id/1342616710/NSA-Snoopings-Negative-Impact-On-Business-Would-Have-The-
Founding-Fathers-Aghast. 
18 NSA Scandal:  UK and Canadian Business Wary of Storing Data in the US, PEER 1 HOSTING, (Jan. 
8, 2014), http://www.peer1.com/news-update/nsa-scandal-uk-and-canadian-businesses-wary-storing-
data-in-us. 
19 Id.;  see also Mary DeRosa, U.S. Cloud Services Companies Are Paying Dearly for NSA Leaks, 
NEXTGOV (Mar. 24, 2014), http://www.nextgov.com/technology-news/tech-insider/2014/03/us-cloud-
services-companies-are-paying-dearly-nsa-leaks/81100/ (reporting estimates of losses of $22 billion 
over the next three years). 
20 IT Industries Set to Lose Billions Because of Privacy Concerns, supra note 12. This number 
includes domestic customers who may go elsewhere to find greater privacy protections. See Gustin, 
supra note 11. 
21 Sean Gallagher, NSA Leaks Blamed for Cisco’s Falling Sales Overseas (Updated), ARS TECHNICA, 
(Dec. 11, 2013, 5:05 AM), http://www.arstechnica.com/information-technology/2013/12/nsa-leaks-
blamed-for-ciscos-failing-sales-overseas/; Paul Taylor, Cisco Warns Emerging Market Weakness is 
no Blip, FIN. TIMES, (Dec. 13, 2013, 12:07 AM), http:www/ft/com/intl/cms/s/0/fb757c4e-637b-11e3-
a87d-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3ILJr30Gr; Spencer E. Ante, Qualcomm CEO Says NSA Fallout 
Impacting China Business, WALL. ST. J., Nov. 22, 2013, 
http://www.online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304337404579214353783842062; Miller, 
supra note 11. 
22 Julian Hattem, Tech Takes Hit from NSA, THE HILL (June 30, 2014, 6:00 AM), 
http://thehill.com/policy/technology/210880-tech-takes-hit-from-nsa. 
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provided services to a number of government departments.23  As a senior analyst at 
the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation explained, “It’s clear to 
every single tech company that this is affecting their bottom line.”24  The European 
commissioner for digital affairs, Neelie Kroes, predicts that the fallout for U.S. 
businesses in the EU alone will amount to billions of Euros.25   
Not only are U.S. companies losing customers, but they have been forced to 
spend billions to add encryption features to their services.  IBM has invested more 
than a billion dollars to build data centers in London, Hong Kong, Sydney, and 
elsewhere, in an effort to reassure consumers outside the United States that their 
information is protected from U.S. government surveillance. 26   Salesforce.com 
made a similar announcement in March 2014.27  Google moved to encrypt terms 
entered into its browser.28  In June 2014 it took the additional step of releasing the 
source code for End-to-End, its newly-developed browser plugin that allows users 
to encrypt email prior to it being sent across the Internet.29  The following month 
Microsoft announced Transport Layer Security for inbound and outbound email, 
and Perfect Forward Secrecy encryption for access to OneDrive.30  Together with 
the establishment of a Transparency Center, where foreign governments could 
review source code to assure themselves of the integrity of Microsoft software, the 
company sought to put an end to both NSA back door surveillance and doubt about 
the integrity of Microsoft products.31  
Foreign technology companies, in turn, are seeing revenues increase.  Runbox, 
for instance, an email service based in Norway and a direct competitor to Gmail 
and Yahoo, almost immediately made it publicly clear that it does not comply with 
foreign court requests for its customers’ personal information. 32  Its customer base 
increased 34% in the aftermath of the Snowden leaks.33 Mateo Meier, CEO of 
Artmotion, Switzerland’s biggest offshore data hosting company, reported that 
within the first month of the leaks, the company saw a 45% rise in revenue.34  
Because Switzerland is not a member of the EU, the only way to access data in a 
Swiss data center is through an official court order demonstrating guilt or liability; 
there are no exceptions for the United States.35  In April 2014, Brazil and the EU, 
which previously used U.S. firms to supply undersea cables for transoceanic 
23 Andrea Peterson, German Government to Drop Verizon over NSA Spying Fears, WASH. POST, June 
26, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2014/06/26/german-government-to-
drop-verizon-over-nsa-spying-fears/. 
24 Id. 
25 Eoyang & Horwirz, supra note 17. 
26 Miller, supra note 11. 
27 Id. 
28 Danny Sullivan, Post-PRISM, Google Confirms Quietly Moving to Make All Searches Secure, 
Except for Ad Clicks, SEARCH ENGINE LAND (Sept. 23, 2013, 11:53 AM) 
http://searchengineland.com/post-prism-google-secure-searches-172487. 
29 Klint Finley, Google Renews Battle with the NSA by Open Sourcing Email Encryption Tool, WIRED 
(June 3, 2014, 7:41 PM), http://www.wired.com/2014/06/end-to-end/. 
30 Matt Thomlinson, Advancing our Encryption and Transparency Efforts, MICROSOFT (July 1, 2014), 
http://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2014/07/01/advancing-our-encryption-and-transparency-
efforts/; see also Carly Page, Microsoft Installs Tougher Outlook and Onedrive Encryption to Curb 
NSA Snooping, THE INQUIRER, (July 1, 2014, 3:36 PM), 
http://www.theinquirer.net/inquirer/news/2353073/microsoft-installs-better-outlook-and-onedrive-
encryption-to-curb-nsa-snooping. 
31 Thomlinson, supra note 29. 
32 Miller, supra note 11. 
33 Id. 
34 Gilbert, supra note 16. 
35 Id. 
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communications, decided to build their own cables between Brazil and Portugal, 
using Spanish and Brazilian companies in the process. 36   OpenText, Canada’s 
largest software company, now guarantees customers that their data remains 
outside the United States.  Deutsche Telekom, a cloud computing provider, is 
similarly gaining more customers.37  Numerous foreign companies are marketing 
their products as “NSA proof” or “safer alternatives” to those offered by U.S. 
firms, gaining market share in the process.38 
 
B.  Trade Agreements 
 
The NSA programs, and media coverage of them, have further impacted bi- 
and multi-lateral trade negotiations, undermining U.S. economic security.  
Consider two of the most important talks currently underway:  the Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).   
TTIP is a trade and investment negotiation that is being conducted between the 
European Commission and the United States.  The purpose of the agreement is to 
create better trade relations between the two region, enabling companies on both 
sides of the Atlantic to thrive.  The revelations about NSA activities have had a 
profound impact on the negotiations. 
In March 2014 the European Parliament passed a resolution noting “the impact 
of mass surveillance.”  It stated, “the revelations based on documents leaked by 
former NSA contractor Edward Snowden put political leaders under the obligation 
to address the challenges of overseeing and controlling intelligence agencies in 
surveillance activities and assessing the impact of their activities on fundamental 
rights and the rule of law in a democratic society.” 39   It recognized that the 
programs had undermined “trust between the EU and the US as transatlantic 
partners.”  Not least were concerns that the information could be used for 
“economic and industrial espionage”—and not merely for the purpose of heading 
off potentially violent threats.  Parliament strongly emphasized, “given the 
importance of the digital economy in the relationship and in the cause of rebuilding 
EU-US trust,” that its “consent to the final TTIP agreement could be endangered as 
long as the blanket mass surveillance activities and the interception of 
communications in EU institutions and diplomatic representations are not 
completely abandoned and an adequate solution is found for the data privacy rights 
of EU citizens.”   The resolution underscored that any agreement to TTIP would 
hinge on the protection of the data privacy rights as reflected in the protection of 
fundamental rights in the EU Charter.40 
Even if the surveillance programs do not entirely derail TTIP, they have the 
potential to significantly retard negotiations.41  Much is at stake.  The Center for 
Economic Policy Research in London, for instance, estimates that a successful 
TTIP could improve U.S. workers’ wages, provide new jobs, and increase the 
36 Miller, supra note 11. 
37 Id. 
38 Mark Scott, European Firms Turn Privacy into Sales Pitch, N. Y. TIMES, June 11, 2014, 
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/06/11/european-firms-turn-privacy-into-sales-pitch/. 
39 European Parliament Resolution of March 12, 2014 on the NSA surveillance Programme, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&reference=P7-TA-2014-
0230. 
40 Id. 
41 See, e.g., Patrick Donahue and Arne Delfs, Germany Demands U.S. Honesty on Spying after 
Expulsion, Bloomberg Business, July 11, 2014, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-07-
10/germany-kicks-out-u-s-spy-as-relations-decline-to-low. 
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country’s GDP by $100 billion per year. 42  Another study, conducted by the 
Bertelsmann Foundation, suggests that TTIP “could increase GDP per capita in the 
United States by 13 percent over the long term.”43  To the extent that the programs 
weaken the U.S. position in the negotiations, the impact could be significant.44 
Although the United States Trade Representative is trying to counter the 
political fallout from the NSA debacle by putting local data protection initiatives 
on the table in the TTIP negotiations, the EU has steadfastly resisted any expansion 
into this realm. 
TPP, in turn, is a trade agreement that the United States is negotiating with 11 
countries in the Asia-Pacific region (Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, 
Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam).   TPP 
(with participation of Japan), accounts for nearly 40% of global GDP, about 1/3 of 
world trade. Two of the United States’ objectives in these negotiations are directly 
implicated by the Snowden releases:  e-commerce / telecommunications, and 
intellectual property rights.   
The NSA programs relate to a number of categories under e-commerce—such 
as rules preventing discrimination based on the country of origin, and efforts to 
construct a single, global Internet.  Nevertheless, as discussed below, some of the 
countries involved in TPP have already adopted data localization laws.  The NSA 
programs have thus weakened the United States’ negotiation position in these 
discussions, by making it more difficult to reach agreement in key areas.   
In addition to e-commerce considerations, as part of the TPP negotiations, the 
United States has prioritized intellectual property rights.  Some 40 million 
American jobs are directly or indirectly tied to “IP-intensive” industries.  These 
jobs tend to be high-paying and stimulate approximately 60% of U.S. merchandise 
exports, as well as a significant portion of services.  Efforts to make progress in 
TPP by developing stronger protections for patents, trademarks copyrights, and 
trade secrets—including safeguards against cyber theft of trade secrets—is made 
more perilous by the existence of the NSA programs. 
 
C.  Data Localization and Data Protection 
 
Over the past eighteen months, countries around the world have increasingly 
adopted data localization laws, restricting the storage, analysis, and transfer of 
digital information to national borders.45  To some extent, the use of barriers to 
trade as a means of incubating tech-based industries predated the Snowden 
42 William Schomberg and Roberta Rampton, Credit Markets:  EU, U.S. leaders launch free-trade 
talks, Reuters, June 17, 2013, 
http://mobile.reuters.com/article/creditMarkets/idUSBRE95G0MD20130617. 
43 William Schomberg and Roberta Rampton, Credit Markets:  EU, U.S. leaders launch free-trade 
talks, Reuters, June 17, 2013, 
http://mobile.reuters.com/article/creditMarkets/idUSBRE95G0MD20130617.  See also Bertlesmann 
Foundation, Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP):  Who benefits form a free trade 
deal?, Part 1:  Macroeconomic Effects, http://www.bfna.org/sites/default/files/TTIP-
GED%20study%2017June%202013.pdf. 
44 Even if NSA surveillance doesn’t derail the TTIP, it could certainly slow it down. The Center for 
Economic Policy Research in London predicts the TTIP would improve wages, provide new job 
opportunities, and increase U.S. GDP by $127 billion per year. A study commissioned by 
Bertelsmann Foundation says the TTIP “could  
45 Jonah Force Hill, The Growth of Data Localization Post-Snowden:  Analysis and 
Recommendations for U.S. Policymakers and Industry Leaders, (July 21, 2014) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with the Lawfare Research Paper Series). 
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releases.46  In the aftermath of the leaks, the dialogue has gained momentum.  The 
asserted purpose is to protect government data and consumer privacy.  
As of the time of writing, China, Greece, Malaysia, Russia, South Korea, 
Venezuela, Vietnam, Iran, and others have already implemented local data server 
requirements. 47  Turkey has introduced new privacy regulations preventing the 
transfer of personal data (particularly locational data) overseas.48  Others, such as 
Argentina, India, and Indonesia are actively considering new laws, even as 
Brazilian president, Dilma Rousseff, has been promoting a law that would require 
citizens’ personal data to be stored within domestic bounds. 49   Germany and 
France are considering a Schengen routing system, retaining as much online data 
in the European Union as possible.50 
As a regional matter, the European Union (EU) Commission’s Vice President, 
Viviane Reding, is pushing for Europe to adopt more expansive privacy laws.51 In 
March 2014, the European Parliament passed the Data Protection Regulation and 
Directive, imposing strict limits on the handling of EU citizens’ data.52  Reding 
announced, “The message the European Parliament is sending is unequivocal:  
This reform is a necessity, and now it is irreversible.  Europe’s directly elected 
parliamentarians have listened to European citizens and European businesses and, 
with this vote, have made clear that we need a uniform and strong European data 
protection law, which will. . . strengthen the protection of our citizens.” 53  
Regardless of where the information is based, those handling the data must obtain 
the consent of the data subjects to having their personal information processed.  
They also retain the right to later withdraw consent.  Those violating the directive 
face steep fines, including up to five percent of revenues.54  Apart from the new 
directive, the Civil Liberties, Justice, and Home Affairs Committee of the 
European Parliament passed a resolution calling for the end of the US/EU Safe 
46 See, e.g., Stephen J. Ezell, el al., Localization Barriers to Trade:  Threat to the Global Innovation 
Economy, (Sept. 25 2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Information Technology & 
Innovation Foundation). 
47 Heads Up for Privacy, Data Protection and Cybersecurity in 2014, SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP (Dec. 30, 
2013) http://m.sidley.com/ring-in-the-new-things-to-watch-in-2014-12-23-2013/; The National 
Information Network, International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran, Nov. 10, 2014, 
http://www.iranhumanrights.org/2014/11/internet-reportthe-national-information-network-national-
internet/.  
48 Richard Chirgwin, USA Opposes ‘Schengen Cloud’ Eurocentric Routing Plan, THE REGISTER (Apr. 
7, 2014, 12:58 AM), 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/04/07/keeping_data_away_from_the_us_not_on_ustr/. 
49 Levy, supra note 10. 
50 See, e.g., Jeanette Seiffert, Weighing a Schengen Zone for Europe’s Internet Data, DEUTSCHE 
WELLE (Feb. 20, 2014), http://www.dw.de/weighing-a-schengen-zone-for-europes-internet-data/a-
17443482 ; Interview by Louisa Schaefer with Philipp Blank, Spokesperson, Deutsche Telekom (Oct. 
18, 2013), available at http://www.dw.de/deutsche-telekom-internet-data-made-in-germany-should-
stay-in-germany/a-17165891.   
51 Eoyang & Horwitz, supra note 16. 
52 European Parliament legislative resolution of 12 March 2014 on the proposal for a regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing 
of personal data and on the free movement of such data (General Data Protection Regulation 
(COM(2012)0011 – C7-0025/2012 – 2012/0011(COD)), available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2014-
0212+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN; European Commission Press Release, Progress on EU Data 
Protection Reform Now Irreversible Following European Parliament Vote, Strasbourg, 12 Mar. 
2014, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-186_en.htm. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
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Harbor agreement. 55   Some 3000 U.S. companies rely on this framework to 
conduct business with the EU.56   
In May 2014, the EU Court of Justice ruled that users have a “right to be 
forgotten” in their use of online search engines. 57   The case derived from a 
complaint lodged against a Spanish newspaper, as well as Google Spain and 
Google Inc., claiming that notice of the plaintiff’s repossessed home on Google’s 
search engine infringed his right to privacy because the incident had been fully 
addressed years before.  He requested that the newspaper be required to remove or 
alter the pages in question to excise data related to him, and that Google Spain or 
Google Inc. be required to remove the information.58   
The EU court found that even where the physical server of a company 
processing information is not located in Europe, as long as the company has a 
branch or subsidiary and is doing business in a Member state, the 1995 Data 
Protection Directive applies.59  Because search engines contain personal data, they 
are subject to such data protection laws.  The court recognized that, under certain 
conditions, individuals have the “right to be forgotten”—i.e., the right to request 
that search engines remove links containing personal information.  Data that is 
inaccurate, inadequate, irrelevant, or excessive may be removed.  Not absolute, the 
right to be forgotten must be weighed against competing rights, such as freedom of 
expression and the media.60 
Various country-specific privacy laws are similarly poised to be introduced.  
Their potential economic impact is substantial.  The Information Technology and 
Innovation Fund estimates that data privacy rules could retard the growth of the 
technology industry by up to four percent, impacting U.S. companies’ ability to 
expand and forcing them out of existing markets.61 
The current dialogue is merely the latest in a series of growing concerns about 
the absence of effective privacy protections within the U.S. legal regime.  High 
tech companies appear to see this as a concern.  As Representative Justin Amash 
(MI-R) has explained, “Businesses increasingly recognize that our government’s 
out-of-control surveillance hurts their bottom line and costs American jobs.  It 
violates the privacy of their customers and it erodes American businesses’ 
competitive edge.”62   
It is with the impact of lack of privacy controls in the surveillance sphere on 
U.S. competitiveness in mind that, in December 2013, some of the largest U.S. 
Internet companies launched a campaign to pressure the government to reform the 
NSA programs.  Microsoft General Counsel Brad Smith explained: “People won’t 
55 Press Release, European Parliament, NSA Snooping;  MEPS Table Proposals to Protect EU 
citizens’ Privacy  (Feb. 12, 2014) available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-
room/content/20140210IPR35501/html/NSA-snooping-MEPs-table-proposals-to-protect-EU-
citizens’-privacy. 
56 Alex Byers, Tech Safe Harbor Under Fire in Europe, POLITICO MORNING TECH (Nov.  6, 2013, 
10:27 AM), http://www.politico.com/morningtech/1113/morningtech12137.html. 
57 C-131/12, Google Spain v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, CURIA (2014), 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document_print.jsf?doclang=EN&text&pageIndex=0&part=1&
mode=DOC&docid=152065&occ=first&dir&cid=437838.  
58 See id. 
59 See id.; see also Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 
1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free 
Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31. 
60 See Google Spain, supra note 55. 
61 Michael Hickens, Spying Fears Abroad Hurt U.S. Tech Firms, WALL ST. J., Feb. 3, 2014, 
http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303743604579350611848246016. 
62 Gustin, supra note 11 
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use technology they don’t trust.”  He added, “Governments have put this trust at 
risk, and governments need to help restore it.”63  Numerous high technology CEOs 
supported the initiative, such Google’s Larry Page, Yahoo’s Marissa Mayer, and 
Facebook’s Mark Zuckerberg. 64   The aim is to limit government authority to 
collect user data, to institute better oversight and accountability, to ensure greater 
transparency about what the government is requesting (and obtaining), to increase 
respect for the free flow of data across borders, and to avoid political clashes on a 
global scale.  Mayer, explained, “Recent revelations about government 
surveillance activities have shaken the trust of our users, and it is time for the 
United States government to act to restore the confidence of citizens around the 
world.”65 
 
D.  Internet Governance 
 
From the inception of the Internet, the U.S.-based Internet Corporation for 
Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) has governed the web.  As time has 
progressed, and the Internet has become part of the global infrastructure, there 
have been calls from several nations to end U.S. dominance and to have the 
International Telecommunication Union (ITU), an entity within the UN, become 
the governing body. 66   The global backlash against the NSA programs raises 
question about the future of Internet governance.  The revelations have not only 
contributed further to such calls, but they have spurred increased discussion of the 
need for regional Internet control.67 
Over the past decade, three main groups have emerged to vie for control of the 
Internet.  The first is centered on states, who consider the question in light of 
national sovereignty.  It is comprised of developing countries as well as large, 
emerging economies like China, Russia, Brazil, and South Africa.68  It overlaps 
significantly with the Group of 77 (consisting of more than 100 countries which 
emerged from the non-aligned movement in the Cold War).  These states are 
critical of the United States and its dominant role in Internet governance and 
oppose private sector preeminence, on the grounds that they are pawns of the 
United States.69  Emphasis instead is placed on the UN and the ITU as potential 
repositories of Internet authority.  The second group is civil society.  The third is 
the private sector.  These groups tend to support what is referred to as a 
“multistakeholder model:”  i.e., native Internet governance institutions that are 
generally nonprofit entities in the private sector. 70   Membership includes both 
63 Brad Smith, TWITTER (Dec. 8, 2013), https://twitter.com/BradSmi/status/409912923952140289.  
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 See Eric Pfanner, U.S. rejects Telecommunications Treaty, NEW YORK TIMES (Dec. 13, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/14/technology/14iht-treaty14.html?pagewanted=1. 
67 See, e.g., ICANN, https://www.icann.org/ (last visited Feb. 9, 2015). 
68 Milton Mueller & Ben Wagner, Finding a Formula for Brazil:  Representation and Legitimacy in 
Internet Governance 3 (2014), (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania 
Annenberg School Internet Policy Observatory Working Paper Series), available at 
http://www.internetgovernance.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/MiltonBenWPdraft_Final.pdf. 
69 See, e.g., Amanda Holpuch, Brazil’s controversial plan to extricate the internet form US control, 
THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 20, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/20/brazil-dilma-
rousseff-internet-us-control (“Rousseff proposed a set of ambitious, and controversial, measures that 
include: constructing submarine cables that do not route through the US, building internet exchange 
points in Brazil, creating an encrypted email service through the state postal service and having 
Facebook, Google and other companies store data by Brazilians on servers in Brazil.”). 
70 Id. 
 10 
                                                        
technical experts (e.g., ICANN and Regional Internet Registries), as well as 
multinational corporations (e.g., Microsoft, Facebook, and AT&T).  Prior to the 
Snowden releases, Japan, the EU, and the United States found themselves in this 
camp.  Civil society organizations emphasize Internet freedom, consumer privacy, 
and user rights—often bringing them into conflict with the states who comprise the 
G77-type group.71  As one commentator explains, “This alignment of actors has 
been in place since the 2003 World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) 
meetings.  But the Snowden NSA revelations seem to have destabilized this settled 
political alignment.”72   
In the wake of the Snowden documents, ICANN and Brazil have formed an 
alliance, condemning U.S. actions.  Concern about the latest revelations spurred a 
major conference in April 2014, the Global Multistakeholder Conference on the 
Future of Internet Governance.  The purpose of the meeting, which was held in 
Sao Paulo, was “to produce universal internet principles and an institutional 
framework for multi-stakeholder Internet governance.”73 
It is not clear how the newest shifts will be resolved—either temporarily or in 
the future.  But significant questions have been raised:  How should the Internet 
governance be structured to ensure legitimacy and compliance?  Who gets to make 
the decision about what such governance looks like?  Which bodies have the 
authority to establish future rules and procedures?  How are such bodies 
constituted and who selects their membership?   
These questions are fundamentally at odds with the decentralization tendencies 
in the Internet—tendencies that have been exaggerated post-Snowden as a result of 
regional efforts to expand the local sphere of influence and to protect consumer 
and state privacy from U.S. surveillance. 
The U.S. government’s failure to address the situation domestically has 
undermined the tech industry.  Despite calls from the companies for legislative 
reform to address the breadth of the NSA programs,74 there has been no significant 
shift that would allow companies to approach their customers to say, with truth, 
that the situation has changed.   Resultantly, American companies are losing not 
just customers, but also the opportunity to submit proposals for contracts for which 
they previously would have been allowed to compete.75  The future of Internet 
governance hangs in the balance. 
 
III.  ECONOMIC SECURITY AS NATIONAL SECURITY 
 
The NSA programs illustrate lawmakers’ failure to recognize the degree to which 
economic strength is central to national security, as well as the importance of the 
high technology industry to the U.S. economy.   
The concept of economic security as national security is not new:  the Framers 
and the generations that followed acknowledged the importance of economic 
strength as central to national security.  Our more recent understandings, however, 
have gotten away from the concept, in the process cleaving important interests out 
of the calculations required to accurately understand the implications of 
government actions.  Unintended consequences have resulted.  The Snowden 
71 Id. at 4. 
72 Id.  
73 Id., at 2. 
74 See, e.g., Gustin, supra note 11 (reporting that the nation’s largest Internet companies are calling 
for Congress and the Administration to reform the secret surveillance programs). 
75 Miller, supra note 11. 
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leaks, for instance, may have driven bad actors to seek non-U.S. companies for ISP 
services, creating gaps in insight into their operations.  They have also undermined 
U.S. efforts to call other countries to heel for their exploitation of international 
communications to gain advantages over U.S. industry.  In sum, the expansive 
nature of the programs may well have acted to undermine U.S. national security in 
myriad ways linked to the country’s economic interests. 
 
A.  Economic Security from the Founding 
 
Despite its appearance throughout U.S. history, the term “national security” is 
rarely defined in law.76  The 1947 National Security Act, for instance, which, inter 
alia, constituted the National Military Establishment (later the Department of 
Defense), and the National Security Council, refers to “national security” more 
than 100 times; yet, it does not define the term. 77   The Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act of 1978 employs the term nearly a dozen times, to ascertain what 
matters fall within the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court’s purview, who can 
certify an application to FISC, and under what conditions in camera and ex parte 
proceedings can be held.78  Where the Attorney General ascertains that a national 
security threat exists, officials may secretly search and seize property—waiting 
notice otherwise required under the Fourth Amendment.79  But no definition is 
provided in FISA.  Nor does the USA PATRIOT Act prove more illuminating—
despite referring to national security more than two dozen times.80 
Definitions of national security that are found in the U.S. Code tend to limit 
consideration to foreign affairs and matters related to military strength.81  Under 
the Classified Information Procedures Act, “national security” is understood as 
involving matters related to the “national defense and foreign relations of the 
United States.”82  Nowhere does the definition reference U.S. economic security. 
In the amended National Security Act, while the term could potentially be 
understood to encompass U.S. economic security, the actual definition does not 
specify a precise link to economic vitality.  Instead, “intelligence related to 
national security” refers to: 
 
all intelligence, regardless of the source from which derived and 
including information gathered within or outside the United States, that 
(A) pertains, as determined consistent with any guidance issued by 
the President, to more than one United States Government agency;  
and 
(B) that involves— 
(i) threats to the United States, its people, property, or interests; 
(ii) the development, proliferation, or use of weapons of mass destruc-
tion; or 
76 See Laura K. Donohue, The Limits of National Security, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1573, 1579 (2011). 
77 National Security Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-235, 61 Stat. 495 (current version at 50 U.S.C. § 401 
(2012)). 
78 50 U.S.C. §§ 1803(e), 1804(a), 1806(f), and 1845(f) (2012). 
79 50 USC §1825(b) (2012). 
80 See, e.g., Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Require to Intercept 
and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, §505, 115 Stat. 272, 
365–66. 
81 See, e.g., 10 U.S.C.A. § 948a (West) (“The term ‘national security’ means the national defense and 
foreign relations of the United States.”). 
82 Classified Information Procedures Act, 18 U.S.C. app. § 1(b) (2012). 
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(iii) any other matter bearing on United States national or homeland 
security.83 
 
The Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 (providing rules for 
government-wide information security) similarly fails to consider the economic 
underpinnings of national security, instead, understanding national security 
systems as any system: 
 
(i) the function, operation, or use of which 
(I) involves intelligence activities; 
(II) involves cryptologic activities related to national security; 
(III) involves command and control of military forces; 
(IV) involves equipment that is an integral part of a weapon or 
weapons system; or 
(V) subject to subparagraph (B), is critical to the direct fulfillment 
of military or intelligence missions; or 
(ii) is protected at all times by procedures established for information 
that have been specifically authorized under criteria established by an 
Executive order or an Act of Congress to be kept classified in the 
interest of national defense or foreign policy.84 
 
While there may be room in the definition for economic considerations, they are 
not front and center. 
Executive Branch articulations are similarly unhelpful.  President George W. 
Bush’s five-page National Security Presidential Directive 1 referred to “national 
security” thirty-three times, without any definition. 85  President Barak Obama’s 
Presidential Policy Directive 1 (“PPD-1”), in turn, addressing the National Security 
Council, referred to “national security” thirty-three times—without ever defining 
it.86  Like the Executive Branch, courts tend to look to the military and diplomatic 
aspects of national security, instead of their economic concomitant.87 
Despite the lack of emphasis on economic strength in statutory definitions, the 
Founders were well aware of the importance of the economy in fostering 
international independence.  The Articles of Confederation failed in significant 
part because the national government lacked the resources, and the economic 
strength, to protect the Union.  For Alexander Hamilton, absent military might, 
diplomatic stature, and commercial success, the country would cease to exist.88   
One of the first expansions of the executive, accordingly, was to include a 
Secretary of the Treasury, which, along with the Secretary of War and the 
establishment of the office of the Attorney General, reflected the purposes for 
which Union had been sought:  foreign relations, military strength, economic 
growth, and the rule of law. 89  In his Farewell Address, President George 
83 50 U.S.C. § 401a(5) (2012). 
84  44 U.S.C. § 3542(b)(2)(A) (2012). 
85 National Security Presidential Directive on the Organization of the National Security Council 
System (Feb. 13, 2001), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-1.htm. 
86 See Presidential Study Directive on Organizing for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism (Feb. 
23, 2009), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/psd/psd-1.pdf (“[C]onceptually and function-
ally, [national security and homeland security] should be thought of together rather than separately.”). 
87 See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 719 (1971) (Black, J., concurring). 
88 FEDERALIST No. 1, (Alexander Hamilton). 
89 19 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789, at 125-26 (available at 
http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-
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Washington called for U.S. energies to be directed towards strengthening the U.S. 
economy:  “[T]he great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations is in 
extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little political connection 
as possible.”90   
The federal government was willing, from a very early date, to act in support 
of its commercial interests with whatever diplomatic, legal, and military power it 
could muster.91   
History is telling.  The Monroe Doctrine was premised largely on this 
approach.92  In 1837, President Martin Van Buren came to office determined to 
continue Washington’s legacy, underscoring the importance of avoiding entangling 
alliances while pursuing America’s economic interests abroad. 93   President 
Zachary Taylor came to office in 1849 determined to continue the course, 
emphasizing the importance of bolstering trade as a means of securing the 
country. 94   The 1850 Clayton-Bulwer Treaty ensured that future canal access 
through Central America would be open to international trade.95   
As Millard Fillmore succeeded Taylor, he considered commerce central to 
U.S. interests abroad—for this reason, the Navy would require further resources to 
protect trade along the Pacific Coast.96  Upon taking office, President Franklin 
Pierce reiterated the same policies:  of the complicated European tumults and 
anxieties, the United States was to be exempt, “But the vast interests of commerce 
are common to all mankind, and the advantages of trade and international 
intercourse must always present a noble field for the moral influence of a great 
people.”   
The United States went on to emphasize its dealings with Asia and to sign an 
historic trade agreement with Japan.97   Expansionism, and the economic benefits it 
brought, similarly proved central to U.S. national security.  “Should [new 
possessions] be obtained,” Pierce asserted during his Inaugural Address, “it will be 
through no grasping spirit, but with a view to obvious national interest and 
security, and in a manner entirely consistent with the strictest observance of 
national faith.”  From the 1898 Spanish-American War forward, the country 
promoted its national interests through formative political, military, and economic 
engagement in the international arena. 
To the extent that the NSA programs, and public knowledge of them, has 
harmed the U.S. economy, they have harmed U.S. national security.  The country’s 
economic strength is part of what enables the United States to respond to external 
and internal threats.  The ability to defend the country against would-be aggressors 
requires resources—e.g., to build and equip a military force, to move troops, to 
bin/ampage?collId=lljc&fileName=019/lljc019.db&recNum=137&itemLink=r%3Fammem%2Fhlaw
%3A%40field%28DOCID%2B%40lit%28jc0191%29%29%230190001&linkText=1) 
90 President George Washington, Farewell Address (Sept. 19, 1796). 
91 For a catalog of every military intervention in support of U.S. commercial interests, see WILLIAM 
APPLEMAN WILLIAMS, EMPIRE AS A WAY OF LIFE: AN ESSAY ON THE CAUSES AND CHARACTER OF 
AMERICA’S PRESENT PREDICAMENT ALONG WITH A FEW THOUGHTS ABOUT AN ALTERNATIVE (1st ed. 
1980). 
92 Mark Gilderhus, The Monroe Doctrine: Meanings and Implications, 36 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 5, 
5-6 (2006) (describing Monroe Doctrine rhetoric as “a cover for less ennobling purposes connected 
with the defense of strategic and economic interests.”). 
93 President Martin Van Buren, Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1837). 
94 President Zachary Taylor, Inaugural Address (Mar. 5, 1849). 
95 Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Apr. 19, 1850, 9 Stat. 995. 
96 President Millard Fillmore, Message to Congress (Dec. 2, 1850). 
97 Treaty of Amity and Commerce, U.S.-Japan, July 29, 1858, 12 Stat. 1051. 
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respond to attacks in whatever form they may materialize.  Many of the supplies 
needed to fend off overreaching by either states or non-state actors derive not from 
government production, but from the private sector.  To the extent that a weak 
private sector emerges, the government’s ability to respond is harmed.  
Beyond this, economic security allows the country the freedom to determine 
its international and domestic policies on the merits, not on need.  Where the 
United States is in a strong economic position, it is less vulnerable in international 
negotiations, such as those related to trade.  It is also in a politically superior 
position, where it can use its wealth to accomplish the desired ends. 
A strong economy also ensures that citizens have their needs met, with 
sufficient income levels for housing, food, clothing, and education.  This, in turn, 
generates social and political stability, which allows for the development of 
communities, which creates greater cohesion among citizens.  It also contributes to 
the evolution of democratic deliberations, reinforcing the rule of law.   
Economic security allows for growth and innovation, which is fed by 
education and opportunity.   Innovation, in turn, allows the country to continue to 
adapt to the evolving environment and international context.  There are further 
considerations.  But these suffice to illustrate the importance of economic strength 
to U.S. national security writ large. 
High technology is central to the U.S. economy. A recent study by the Bay 
Area Economic Council Institute sought to ascertain how important the high tech 
industry is just for the U.S. labor market.  It found that not only are high-tech jobs 
critical for generating employment in other sectors, but that growth in the high-
tech sector has increasingly been happening in areas of great economic and 
geographic diversity, suggesting that the high-tech industry is not limited to one 
ethic, social, or economic strata.   
High-technology has been one of the fastest-growing sectors:  between 2004 
and 2012, the employment growth in high-tech outpaced private sector growth by a 
ratio of 3:1.  Jobs in Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics (STEM) 
outpaced job gains across all occupations by a ratio of 27:1. 98   Employment 
predictions put the demand for high-tech workers to increase 16.2% 2011 to 2020, 
with STEM employment increasing 13.3% during the same period.99 
The study found that the generation of jobs in high-technology had far-
reaching effects.  In addition to the income gains generated by innovation, 
productivity and a global marketplace, high-technology industrial growth 
generated other types of jobs.  Health care, education, law, restaurants, hotels and 
personal services, as well as goods-producing construction sectors grew in tandem 
with high tech, largely because of a local multiplier effect: “For each job created in 
the local high-tech sector,” the study concluded, “approximately 4.3 jobs are 
created in the local non-tradable sector in the long run.”100  
Even as early as 2002, the National Science Foundation found that the global 
market for high-technology goods is growing at a swifter rate than for other 
manufactured goods.  More than this, “high-technology industries are driving 
economic growth around the world.” 101   
98 Bay Area Council Economic Institute Report, Technology Works:  High-Tech Employment and 
Wages in the United States, Dec. 2012, p. 5, 
http://www.bayareaeconomy.org/media/files/pdf/TechReport.pdf. 
99 Id. 
100 Id., at 25. 
101 Industry, Technology, and the Global Marketplace, 2002, 
http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/seind02/c6/c6s1.htm#c6s1l1. 
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This study built on one released in 1995 by the National Academies, which 
had looked carefully at the role and importance of high tech companies in the U.S. 
economy.102   
Indeed, study after study reflects the importance of high-technology in the U.S. 
economy.  In 2015, a Brookings study found that “advanced industries” (which 
include high-technology, STEM, and industries, like aerospace, which are heavily 
dependent on advanced technologies), “represent a sizable economic anchor for the 
U.S. economy.”103  They led the post-recession recovery.  Brookings found that 
with only 9 percent of the total U.S. employment, advanced industries produce 
some $2.7 trillion per year—around 17% of the country’s GDP.  Further, about 60 
percent of U.S. exports are tied to this sector, with 2.2 jobs being created 
domestically for every new advanced industry job.  In sum, “Directly and 
indirectly. . . the sector supports almost 39 million jobs—nearly one-fourth of all 
U.S. employment.”104 
 
B.  National Security Infrastructure 
 
The National Security Council (“NSC”) is “the principal forum for 
consideration of national security policy issues requiring Presidential 
determination.” 105  The President looks to the forum for advice and assistance in 
matters ranging from domestic, foreign and military, to intelligence and 
economic.106   
It is thus somewhat surprising that the 1947 National Security Act includes 
neither the Secretary of the Treasury, nor the Secretary of Commerce, as 
permanent (statutory) members of the NSC.  Instead, the entity is chaired by the 
President, with formal membership extended to the Vice President, the Secretary 
of State, and the Secretary of Defense.107  The Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
acts as the statutory military advisor, the Director of National Intelligence as the 
statutory intelligence advisor, and the Director of National Drug Control Policy as 
the statutory drug control policy advisor.108   
Under PDD-1, the NSC includes the Secretary of Treasury, and “[w]hen 
international economic issues are on the agenda of the NSC, the NSC’s regular 
attendees will include the Secretary of Commerce, the United States Trade 
Representative, the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, and the Chair 
of the Council of Economic Advisers.”109   
102 The National Academies Press, Risk and Innovation:  The Role and Importance of Small, High-
Tech Companies in the U.S. Economy (1995), http://www.nap.edu/catalog/5024/risk-and-innovation-
the-role-and-importance-of-small-high. 
103 America’s Advanced Industries:  What They Are, Where they Are, and Why they Matter, 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Reports/2015/02/03%20advanced%20industries/fi
nal/AdvancedIndustry_FinalFeb2lores.pdf. 
104America’s Advanced Industries:  What They Are, Where they Are, and Why they Matter, 
http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports2/2015/02/03-advanced-industries#/M10420.  See also 
Report, p. 10, 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Reports/2015/02/03%20advanced%20industries/fi
nal/AdvancedIndustry_FinalFeb2lores.pdf.. 
105 Presidential Policy Directive on the Organization of the National Security Council System (Feb. 
13, 2009), available at http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/ppd/ppd-1.pdf. 
106 Id. 
107 50 U.S.C.A. § 3021 (West 2014) 
108 Id. 
109 President Policy Directive, supra note 96. 
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When the emphasis is not international economic issues, the structure does not 
cement economic concerns into the discussion.  Nor does it contemplate the 
inclusion of Treasury or Commerce as an operational matter—i.e., when the 
intelligence community is deciding whether to develop a surveillance program.  
Such matters are not brought directly to the NSC.110   
To the extent that the failure to include these members at the most basic level 
reflects a perspective that potentially sidelines economic concerns, the continued 
failure to build in strong representation at a programmatic level underscores the 
concern.  Economic concerns may be treated with seriousness, but they are not 
meaningfully integrated into the national security infrastructure. 
 
C.  Unintended Harmful Consequences 
 
There are various ways in which the NSA’s apparent failure to take account of 
the potential impact of public knowledge of the programs on U.S. industry may 
have acted to undermine U.S. security beyond weakening the economy. The 
backlash risks shielding foreign government actions from public scrutiny.  It 
potentially undermines the ability of the United States to develop international 
norms against ubiquitous surveillance, which can be used for political or economic 
espionage.  And it raises the possibility that the country will lose digital sight of 
active threats against the United States. 
As was previously noted, the data localization movement, given momentum by 
the NSA revelations, risks the creation of distinct, parallel Internets, which would 
stifle the free flow of information that connects not just economies, but cultures 
and people, with potential rollbacks for an increasingly globalized world.  This 
would affect the country’s interest in democratic engagement and it would harm 
the United States’ international reach.  The creation of national search engines, 
national email systems, and national social networks, moreover, means that foreign 
governments will have direct control over electronic communication networks, 
facilitating censorship and domestic surveillance and limiting outside view of the 
extent to which such steps are being taken.   
When Turkish Prime Minister Recep Erdoğan, for instance, tried to shut town 
Twitter, the international community was immediately put on notice. 111  
#TwitterisblockedinTurkey #dictatorerdogan, and #occupytwitter quickly moved 
to popular trending topics internationally.112 The United States, EU, and others 
formally objected to the action through diplomatic channels.  Had Turkey been an 
isolated network, it may have secretly censored the politically damaging 
information (in this case, leaks revealing corruption in the Erdoğan government), 
without generating such immediate, international attention. 
Along the same lines, in July 2014 President Vladimir Putin signed a new law 
requiring Internet companies to store all Russian users’ data within domestic 
borders.  Russia’s media and parliament members have used Edward Snowden’s 
110 DeRosa, supra note 19. 
111 Kevin Rawlinson, Turkey Blocks Use of Twitter after Prime Minister Attacks Social Media Site, 
The Guardian, Mar. 20, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/21/turkey-blocks-twitter-
prime-minister. 
112 Id; Sebnem Arsu and Dan Bilefsky, In Turkey, Twitter Roars after Effort to Block It, new York 
Times, Mar. 21, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/22/world/europe/turks-seek-to-challenge-
twitter-ban.html?_r=2. 
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leaks about NSA spying to rally support for the new law. 113  The legislation, 
though, serves to intensify Putin’s control over Internet companies. 114  With 
internal data centers, it will be easier for the Russian president to enforce 
censorship policies and to collect information about members of the political 
opposition. The law could also give Putin an excuse to shut down major social 
media networks if they fail to comply with the new regulations.  
The NSA revelations also have undermined U.S. credibility in challenging 
other countries’ efforts to obtain trade secrets and other information through state 
surveillance.  China provides one of the strongest examples.  Because of the NSA 
programs, U.S. objections to China selling surveillance technology to oppressive 
regimes look rather weak.  Post-Snowden, Chinese efforts have become even more 
public and devastating to U.S. interests.   
Since 2005, when President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad first took office, Iran has 
stated its plan to develop a national Internet network.115  In the intervening decade, 
the country has been unable to do so.  But in January 2014 Iran’s Ministry of 
Communications and Information Technology announced that China would 
officially be collaborating with them on the creation of the National Information 
Network. 116  Part of Iran’s aim has been to develop a system that allows the 
country to turn off the international components of the Internet, in a way that will 
enable the government and domestic banking industry to continue to operate.  With 
more than half the population under age 35, Iran has a tech-savvy citizenry, which 
has, to date, found various ways around government efforts to block social media 
and other international sources.  It is not clear whether Iran will be able to 
completely divest itself of access to the world wide web.  What is clear is that in a 
post-Snowden era, their efforts to do so are being facilitated by countries with 
interests diametrically opposed to the United States.  
Online warfare between China and the United States simmered in the 
background, until in early 2013 the Obama Administration began to make it center 
stage.  In January 2013, the New York Times reported that Chinese hackers had 
infiltrated its computers following a threat that if the paper insisted on publishing a 
story about its prime minister, consequences would follow. 117  The following 
month, a security firm, Mandiant, revealed that the Chinese military unit 61398 
had stolen data from U.S. companies and agencies. 118  In March 2013 President 
Obama’s national security advisor publicly urged China to reduce its surveillance 
efforts—after which classified documents leaked to the public demonstrated the 
113 Yasha Levine, Putin Ramps Up Internet Censorship, citing Google and Snowden to Ensure Public 
Support, Pandodaily, Mar. 20, 2014, http://pando.com/2014/03/20/putin-ramps-up-internet-
censorship-citing-google-and-snowden-to-ensure-public-support/. 
114 Sarah Gray, Putin Tightens Grip on Internet:  Signs new law requiring mass storage of Russians’ 
data, Salon, Jul. 23, 2014, 
http://www.salon.com/2014/07/23/putin_tightens_grip_on_internet_signs_new_law_requiring_mass_
storage_of_russians_data/. 
115 Behrang Tajdin, Will Iran’s National Internet Mean No World Wide Web?, BBC News, Apr. 27, 
2013, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-22281336. 
116 https://www.ict.gov.ir/fa/news/10162.  See also Jessica McKenzie, When it Comes to Internet 
Censorship, China and Iran Are All in This Together, TechPresident, Jan. 22, 2014, 
http://techpresident.com/news/wegov/24693/when-it-comes-internet-censorship-china-iran-are-all-
together; China to Help Iran Implement Its Closed National Internet, International Campaign for 
Human Rights in Iran, Jan. 21, 2014, http://www.iranhumanrights.org/2014/01/china-iran-internet/.na 
117 Kurt Eichenwald, How Edward Snowden Escalated Cyber War, NEWSWEEK (Oct. 31, 2013, 7:22 
PM), http://www.newsweek.com/2013/11/01/how-edward-snowden-escalated-cyber-war-
243886.html. 
118 Id. 
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extent to which China had infiltrated U.S. government servers.119  In May 2013, 
the National Security Advisor flew to China to lay the groundwork for a summit, 
in which cyber surveillance would prove center stage.120  Two days before the 
Obama-Xi meeting was scheduled to take place, The Guardian ran the first story 
on the NSA programs. 121  On June 7, when Obama raised the question of Chinese 
espionage, Xi responded by quoting the Guardian and suggesting that the U.S. 
should not be lecturing the Chinese about surveillance.122  Although differences 
may mark the two countries’ approaches to surveillance (e.g., in one case for 
economic advantage, in the other for political or security advantage), the broader 
translation for the global community has been one in which the United States has 
lost high ground to try to restrict cyber-surveillance. 
A final point is worth noting in this context:  namely, to the extent that non-
U.S. companies are picking up customers and business overseas, the United States’ 
ability to conduct surveillance may be further harmed—thus going directly to the 
country’s national security interests.  In other words, it may be in the country’s 
best interests to keep traffic routed through U.S. companies, which would allow 
the national security infrastructure, with appropriate legal process, to access the 
information in question.  The apparent overreach of the NSA, however, may end 
up driving much of the traffic elsewhere, making it harder for the United States to 
obtain the information needed to protect the country against foreign threats. 
 
IV.  STEPS REQUIRED TO REDRESS THE CURRENT SITUATION 
 
Numerous steps could be taken by Congress to address the situation in which U.S. 
industry currently finds itself.  The most effective and influential decision that 
legislators could take would be to curb the NSA’s authorities under the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act.  This action has two components:  first, ending the 
telephony metadata collection program and, second, restricting the use of to/from, 
or about collection under upstream interceptions.  Both programs would further 
benefit from greater transparency, to make it clear that their aim is to prevent 
foreign aggression and to prevent threats to U.S. national security—not to engage 
in the interception of trade secrets or to build dossiers on other countries’ 
populations.   
The second most effective change that could be undertaken would be to 
introduce stricter privacy controls on U.S. companies, in the process bringing the 
United States into closer line with the principles that dominate in the EU.  The two 
entities are not as far apart as the dialogue might have one assume, and so changes 
required in this sphere would be minimal.  Together, these two alterations—
curbing the NSA surveillance programs and providing increased consumer 
protections for privacy—would allow U.S. industry to argue changed 
circumstances to allow companies to again become competitive for contracts and 
markets to which they seek access.   
A third alteration that would make a substantial difference over the longer term 
relates to the national security infrastructure.  The current failure of the United 
States to integrate economic concerns creates a vulnerability for the country in 
terms of the breadth and depth of programs subsequently adopted.  New thought 
119 Id. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. 
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needs to be given on how to take on board—and mitigate—potentially devastating 
economic consequences of government surveillance efforts. 
 
A.  FISA Alterations  
 
In addition to the economic impact of NSA telephony metadata collection 
(discussed, infra), the program runs contrary to Congressional intent in introducing 
the FISA, contradicts the statutory language, and violates the Fourth 
Amendment.123  In 2014, the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board came to 
a similar conclusion, 124  as did the President’s own appointed Review Group, 
charged with considering the telephony metadata collection program, in 2013.125   
Accordingly, the President announced on January 17, 2014 that he was 
“ordering a transition that will end the Section 215 bulk metadata program as it 
currently exists, and establish a mechanism that preserves the capabilities we need 
without the government holding this bulk metadata.”126  The alternative approach 
was to be developed by March 28, 2014.  Nine months later, on September 13, 
2014, the FISC approved the Department of Justices’s (“DOJ”) request to extend 
the program for another 90 days—without any transition program in place.  More 
than a year after the announcement, a new program has yet to be put into place. 
The President issued a new presidential directive for U.S. signals intelligence 
activities, both at home and abroad.  The classified nature of parts of the document, 
international skepticism about the Administration’s commitment to privacy, and 
the failure of the Administration to make good on its promise of transition to a new 
program meant that the global community, with good reason, has questioned 
whether anything has really changed. 
As a matter of Section 702 and the interception of international content, 
PRISM and upstream collection present global concerns—neither of which have 
been addressed through any legislative change.  The existence of these programs, 
while perhaps statutorily consistent with the FISA Amendments Act, as well as 
constitutionally sufficient with regard to the interception of non-U.S. persons 
communications, where the individual is reasonably believed to be located outside 
the United States, as a policy matter, goes some way towards undermining 
international confidence in U.S. companies. 
The Fourth Amendment does not reach non-U.S. persons based overseas who 
lack a substantial connection to the United States.127  Writing for the Court in 
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that “the 
people” referred to in the Fourth Amendment indicate a particular group—not 
merely people qua people. 128   His reading stems from a deeply Aristotelian 
approach:  i.e., one that emphasizes membership in the political community as a 
123 Donohue, Bulk Metadata Collection, supra note 1. 
124 PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., REPORT ON THE TELEPHONE RECORDS PROGRAM 
CONDUCTED UNDER SECTION 215 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT AND ON THE OPERATIONS OF THE 
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT (2014), available at 
https://www.eff.org/files/2014/01/23/final_report_1-23-14.pdf. 
125 PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GRP. ON INTELLIGENCE & COMMC’NS TECHS., LIBERTY AND SECURITY IN A 
CHANGING WORLD, (2013), available at http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/world/nsa-review-
boards-report/674/. 
126 Remarks on United States Signals Intelligence and Electronic Surveillance, 2014 DAILY COMP. 
Pres. Doc. 30 (Jan. 17, 2014). 
127 Donohue, Section 702, supra note 1.  
128 United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990) (per curiam). 
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concomitant of forming a structure of government.129  As members of the polis, 
U.S. persons, both distributively and collectively, obtain the protections of the 
Constitution.   
Viewed in this regard, the Constitution itself embodies the collective 
organization of “the people” into one entity.  “U.S. persons” and “the people” are, 
therefore, one and the same.  The “right of the people” thus refers to a collective 
group of individuals “who are part of a national community or who have otherwise 
developed sufficient connection with this country to be considered part of that 
community.”130  
Very few cases address precisely what constitutes sufficient contact with the 
United States to satisfy the “substantial connections” aspect of the majority’s 
decision.  Those that do point in seemingly different directions.131  At a minimum, 
however, it would be extraordinary to assume that simply because an individual 
uses a U.S. company, he or she thereby gains the protections of the Fourth 
Amendment.  This was the basic argument underlying the “modernization” of 
FISA in the first place, to take account of bad actors, communicating overseas, 
who would suddenly fall within the more protective FISA regime merely because 
their communications happened to come within U.S. territory by nature of the 
carrier in question. 
Even recognizing, however, that few constitutional barriers may apply to the 
programmatic use of Section 702 insofar as it is applied to non-U.S. persons 
(leaving aside the questions that accompany the incidental collection of U.S. 
persons’ information, as well as entirely domestic conversations), as a matter of 
policy, certainly both PRISM and the use of to/from or about collection in 
upstream gathering has dramatically undermined U.S. industry.  As a matter of 
policy, therefore, greater restrictions, more transparency, and more effective 
oversight of the international collection of content may help to alter the situation 
with regard to the skepticism expressed towards U.S. companies. 
The Obama Administration has begun to take steps to acknowledge the 
importance of data privacy for European citizens, but steps have thus far been 
limited to law enforcement, excluding surveillance conducted for national security 
purposes.  In June 2014, Attorney General Eric Holder announced that, as part of 
the EU-U.S. Data Protection and Privacy Agreement, the Administration would 
work with Congress to provide EU citizens the ability to seek redress in U.S. 
courts where personal data, shared with the United States by European countries 
for law enforcement purposes is subsequently intentionally or willfully 
disclosed.132  The Office of the Director of National Intelligence claims this action 
as part of the privacy-protective measures implemented in the wake of the 
Snowden disclosures. 133   The agreement, however, is limited to information 
129 ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, bk.  I (Benjamin Jowett trans.) (c. 350 B.C.E.), available at 
http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/politics.1.one.html. 
130 Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265 (per curiam). 
131 Orin Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and the Global Internet, 67 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015), 
(manuscript at 8–9) (on file with author). 
132 Department of Justice, Attorney General Holder Pledges Support for Legislation to Provide E.U. 
Citizens with Judicial Redress in Cases of Wrongful Disclosure of Their Personal Data Transferred to 
the U.S. for Law Enforcement Purposes, June 25, 2014, http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-
general-holder-pledges-support-legislation-provide-eu-citizens-judicial-redress. 
133 Signals Intelligence Reform, 2015 Anniversary Report, Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence, IC on the Record, http://icontherecord.tumblr.com/ppd-28/2015/privacy-civil-liberties 
(“In furtherance of its commitment to protecting privacy in the law enforcement context, the 
Administration is working with Members of Congress on legislation to give citizens of designated 
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provided by European countries, making it somewhat beside the point. More 
relevantly, the Administration supported the USA FREEDOM Act, which would 
have prohibited the bulk collection of telephony metadata under Section 215 of the 
USA PATRIOT Act (as well as the Pen Registers and Trap and Trace provisions of 
FISA and National Security Letters, which appear in five parts of the U.S. Code).  
Congress, however, failed to pass the USA FREDOM Act.  Actions taken with 
regard to Section 702 have been minimal and generally focused on U.S. persons. 
 
B.  Privacy Law Harmonization 
 
Much ink has been spilled on the cultural and practical differences between the 
United States and the EU with regard to data protection and privacy law.  These 
differences have been over-blown.   
There are myriad ways in which the two regions reflect a similar approach.  
Just as the United States’ Fourth Amendment protects the right to privacy, for 
instance, Article 8 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms embraces the same. 134 These documents 
constitutionally ground two fundamental liberty interests in their respective 
regions’ governing frameworks:  (a) the right to privacy, and (b) freedom from 
arbitrary invasion of one’s private sphere.135  In the European Union, these liberties 
are supported by EU-wide directives, such as the 1995 European Data Protection 
Directive and the EU Internet Privacy Law of 2002.136  Further, in both the EU and 
the U.S. such liberty interests are protected through national legislation, in which a 
judicial remedy is provided for a breach of the right to privacy.137  The manner in 
countries to the right to seek judicial redress for intentional or willful disclosures of protected 
information, and for refusal to grant access or to rectify any errors in that information.”) 
134 Compare U.S. CONST., amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."), with  Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 
available at http://coventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/treaties/html/005.htm (“Everyone has the right to 
respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.”). 
135 Id. 
136 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the 
Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement 
of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31; Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in 
the electronic communications sector, 2002 O.J. (L 201) 37. 
137 Compare Directive 95/46, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on 
the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free 
Movement of Such Data, Recitation 55, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 36, 
with U.S. statutory provisions related to privacy (including, inter alia:  the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2012); Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. 
L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.) (2012), 
Children’s Internet Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 20 and 47 U.S.C.) (2012), Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, 
15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6506 (2012), Fair Credit Reporting Act 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681x (2012), Driver’s 
Privacy Protection Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721-2725 (2012), Electronic Communications Privacy 
Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 
U.S.C.) (2012), Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.) (2012), Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 
552a (2012), Privacy Protection Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000aa-2000aa-12 (2012), Right to 
Financial Privacy Act of 1978, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (2012), Telephone Consumer Protection Act 
of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-243, 105 Stat. 2394 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 
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which these rights are treated is similarly consistent.  In both spheres, these rights 
are offset against the obligations owed by the data holder to the individual to 
whom the information relates.138 
As a substantive matter, the two regions have adopted similar provisions.  In 
the EU and the U.S., for instance, heightened protections are provided for what is 
known as personally-identifiable information. 139  A series of exceptions to the 
dominant structure is provided in two central areas:  security (including, e.g., 
criminal law, public security, defense, and national security) and freedom of 
expression (such as with regard to journalism, literary pursuits, artistic expression, 
and political opinions). 140  To ensure that the substantive measures reflect the 
underlying constitutional principles, both regions insist on minimization—i.e., that 
the information collected on individuals be limited to what is strictly necessary for 
the purposes delineated by statute.141 
Both the U.S. and the EU have established a set of substantive requirements 
related to individuals’ knowledge that data about them is being collected, stored, 
and possibly shared with others.  Consent, for instance, is central to both 
systems.142   
Much has been made in regard to the distinction between the opt-in (European 
approach) versus the opt-out (American approach). 143   What has been lost, 
however, is that both approaches rely on the consent of the subject (subject to 
specific exceptions, above), in order to proceed with data gathering, analysis, and 
distribution.  To facilitate this structure, both regions also require that notice be 
provided to targets and that individuals have the right to access information that is 
held about them. 144   Individuals, in both systems, have the right to object to 
particular information, and in both systems, the data holder has a duty to ensure 
that the information is accurate and kept up to date.145 
Keeping in mind the consistencies between the two systems, and the benefits 
to be gained for U.S. industry from emphasizing harmony, there are two areas 
where the regions differ that could be addressed through legislative reform:, 
recognition of residual rights in third party data, and the creation of a 
U.S.C.) (2012), Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2012), and the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-191, 110 Stat. (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.) (2012). 
138 Compare Recitation No. 25, 1995 O.J. (L281) 31,33 with Greenwald & MacAskill, supra note 1. 
139 Compare, e.g., Recitation No. 26, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31,33 with 5 U.S.C. § 552a. 
140 Compare, e.g., Recitation Nos. 16 (national security), 17 (written and artistic expressions), and 36 
(political opinions), 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 32 with Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 
Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.) (2012) 
(national security exceptions and singling out of otherwise protected First Amendment activity).  See 
also Council Directive 2006/24 and Amending Directive 2002/58/EC, 2006 O.J. (L. 105) 54 (creating 
exceptions for criminal law). 
141 Compare Recitation No. 28, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 34 with 92 Stat. 1783 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of the U.S.C.). 
142 Compare Recitation No. 30, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 34 with Greenwalk & McAskill, supra note 1. 
143 See, e.g., Gerhard Steinke, Data privacy approaches from US and EU perspectives, 19 
TELEMATICS AND INFORMATICS 193, 196 (2002) (explaining the EU Data Protection Directive 
requires consumers to opt -in before sensitive information is disclosed to third parties); Tim Worstall, 
The EU Warns Tech Firms: Opt Out Is No Longer Good Enough, Forbes (Jan. 10, 2013), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2013/01/10/the-eu-warns-tech-firms-opt-out-is-no-longer-
good-enough/. 
144 Compare, e.g., Recitation Nos. 38 (notice) and 41 (right of access), 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 35 and 
Greenwalk & McAskill, supra note 1. 
145 Compare, e.g., 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 40, 43, (referring specifically to article 14 (right to object) 
and article. 6 (accurate data)); with Greenwald & McAskill, supra note 1. 
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comprehensive, privacy-protective regime, as opposed to the piecemeal approach 
that currently marks U.S. law. 
 
1.  Residual Rights in Third Party Data 
 
One central question that divides the United States from numerous other 
countries and regions—including the European Union—centers on who owns an 
individual’s data.  In the United States, since Smith v. Maryland (addressing pen 
registers and trap and trace devices), and U.S. v. Miller (focusing on financial 
records), all three branches have treated information held by third parties as 
lacking an individual right to privacy.146   
In contrast, the EU considers that the individual who has provided data to a 
third party to still have a privacy interest in the information. 147   The recent 
European Court decision, recognizing the right to anonymity, necessarily 
presupposes a continued interest in data, even once it is obtained by a third 
party.148 
The difference between the approaches is central to understanding how new 
technologies, such as social network analysis, cloud computing, and data mining, 
have deepened the privacy interests implicated in third party handling of data.  
New technologies allow information to be generated about which, even those to 
whom the data relates are unaware.  To say that individuals do not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in this information rather flies in the face of 
common sense.   
The Supreme Court appears to be coming to this conclusion as well.  In United 
States v. Jones, the Court considered a case involving 28-day surveillance 
involving the placement of a GPS chip on a vehicle. 149   Although ultimately 
decided on grounds of trespass, a shadow majority expressed strong concern about 
the implications of long-term surveillance. Justice Alito, joined by Justice Ginsburg, 
Justice Breyer, and Justice Kagan, suggested that in most criminal investigations, 
long-term monitoring “impinges on expectations of privacy.”150   The nature of new 
technologies mattered: 
 
Recent years have seen the emergence of many new devices that permit 
the monitoring of a person’s movements. In some locales, closed-circuit 
television video monitoring is becoming ubiquitous. On toll roads, 
automatic toll collection systems create a precise record of the 
movements of motorists who choose to make use of their convenience. 
Many motorists purchase cars that are equipped with devices that permit a 
central station to ascertain the car’s location at any time so that roadside 
assistance may be provided if needed and the car may be found if it is 
stolen.151 
 
Justice Sotomayor went one step further, calling into question the entire basis 
for the third party doctrine. Specifically, in light of the level of intrusiveness 
represented by modern technology, “it may be necessary to reconsider the premise 
146 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
147 See, e.g., Recitation No. 47, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 36. 
148 See Google Spain, supra note 55. 
149 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
150 Id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring). 
151. Id. at 963 (Alito, J., concurring). 
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that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information 
voluntarily disclosed to third parties.”152 Sotomayor pointed out: 
 
This approach is ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a 
great deal of information about themselves to third parties in the course of 
carrying out mundane tasks. People disclose the phone numbers that they 
dial or text to the cellular providers; the URLs that they visit and the e-
mail addresses with which they correspond to their Internet service 
providers; and the books, groceries, and medications they purchase to 
online retailers.153 
 
She continued, “I would not assume that all information voluntarily disclosed to 
some member of the public for a limited purpose is, for that reason alone, 
disentitled to Fourth Amendment protection.”154 
Congress has an opportunity to take the lead by recognizing the right to 
privacy still held by data holders when information is collected by third parties.  It 
can then craft statutes accordingly, ensuring that U.S. companies offer greater 
protections for consumers, in the process allowing industry to offset the claims of 
its overseas competitors. 
 
2.  Legal Framework 
 
Thus far, U.S. high technology companies have been subject to a very different 
statutory and regulatory structure than that which prevails in the EU.  In the United 
States, privacy rights have largely been protected via a series of vertical statutes 
dealing with specific areas, such as children using the Internet, driver-related 
information, and medical data.155   
In the EU, in contrast, privacy has been protected by a more omnibus-type 
approach, which horizontally reaches across a number of areas.  This approach is 
reflected in the 1995 Directive as well as the national legislation implementing the 
directive on a country-by-country basis.156  
The vertical statutory scheme has been successful in addressing particular, 
discreet areas where privacy interests reside.  However, outside of these narrow 
exceptions, in the interests of encouraging innovation, the high technology sector 
152. Id. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
153. Id. 
154. Id. 
155 See U.S. statutory provisions related to privacy, supra note 120. 
156 See, e.g., Data Protection Act of 1998, c. 29 (U.K.), available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/29/contents; Bundesdatenchutzgesetz [BDSG] [Federal 
Data Protection Act], May 18, 2001, BGBL, I at 904 (Ger.), available at 
http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/BDSG.htm; Loi 78-17 du 6 janvier 1978 relative à 
l’informatique aux fichiers et aux libertés [Law 78-17 of Jan. 6, 1978 Relating to Data Files and 
Liberties]. JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], 
Jan. 7, 1978, p. 227 (revised in 2004), available at http://www,cnil.fr/documentation/textes-
fondateurs/loi78-17/;, Act on the Amendment of the Personal Data Act (986/2000) (Fin.), available 
at http://www.finlex.fi/pdf/saadkaan/; Act on Processing of Personal Data, Act No. 429, May 2000 
(Den.), available at http://www.datatilsynet.dk/english/the-act-on-processing-of-personal-data/read-
the-act-on-processing-of-personal-data/compiled-version-of-the-act-on-processing-of-personal-data/; 
Nomos (1997:2472) Prostasia ton Fysikon Prosopon Enanti tis Epexergasias Dedomenon Prosopikou 
Charaktira [Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data], Ephemeris tes 
Kyverneseos tes Hellenikes Demokratias [E.K.E.D.] 1997 (Greece), available at 
http://www.freedominfo.org/regions/europe/greece/. 
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has been left largely unregulated by federal statute.  The assumption has been that 
market forces would adjust to protect privacy interests.   
The advantage of this approach has been to give high tech companies a 
significant amount of flexibility, allowing them to independently gauge the 
appropriate level of privacy protections to give to consumers. 
The drawback has been that privacy itself has become commoditized, with 
companies actually making money off of selling consumers’ privacy interests.  
Consider Google and its email service, Gmail, for instance.  The company reads 
and analyzes all of its customers’ emails, it watches what people read, it looks at 
web sites people visit, and it records what people purchase.  The company then 
sells access to customers’ private lives to companies who want to advertise.157  
Thus, the mother who sends an email to her son raising concern about depression 
may receive an ad within hours for psychiatric services, even as a pregnant woman 
merely looking at cribs, may within days receive mail through the U.S. post, 
advertising sales at Babies R’Us. 
In September 2013, Google lost an effort in the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals 
for judicial review of a lower court’s refusal to dismiss multiple class action 
lawsuits accusing Google of violating the Wiretap Act.158  United States District 
Judge Lucy Koh determined that the case was too far along to suffer delays. 159  
Koh’s interpretation of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act limits the 
“ordinary course of business” exception—not least because Google’s practice 
violates its own policies. 160  The lawsuits, filed in California, Florida, Illinois, 
Maryland, and Pennsylvania, at great expense, are ongoing. 
Capitalizing on private data represents a significant breach of the right to 
privacy. Instead of protecting privacy, the market has exploited it for monetary 
gain.  In the United States and overseas, individuals are concerned about the lack 
of protections afforded.  Congressional legislation could fix this problem by 
bringing high technology within the broader statutory framework and thus closing 
a gap in the existing law. 
 
3.  Safe Harbor Considerations 
 
In the wake of the Snowden revelations, the EU Commission issued a report 
recommending the retention of Safe Harbor, but recommending significant 
changes, including required disclosure of cloud computing and other service 
provider contracts used by Safe Harbor members.161   
The Safe Harbor provisions, developed from 1999 to 2000 by the U.S. 
Commerce Department, the Article 31 Committee on Data Privacy, and the 
European Union, created a narrow bridge between the United States and EU.  At 
the time, the European Parliament, which did not bind the European Commission, 
rejected the Safe Harbor provisions by a vote of 279 to 259, with twenty-two 
abstentions.  Chief amongst European concerns was the failure of the agreement to 
provide adequate protections. 
157 Dan Gillmor, As we sweat government surveillance, companies like Google collect our data, THE 
GUARDIAN (Apr. 18, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/apr/18/corporations-
google-should-not-sell-customer-data. 
158 Joffe v. Google, Inc., 746 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 2013). 
159 In re Google Inc., No. 5:13-md-02430, 2013 WL 5423918 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2013). 
160 Id. 
161 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, EUROPEAN 
COMM’N (Nov. 27, 2013), http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/files/com_2013_847_en.pdf 
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In light of the massive data breaches over the past five years in the United 
States, the practices of a largely unregulated high technology industry, and the 
ubiquitous nature of NSA surveillance, Europeans are now even less supportive of 
the Safe Harbor provisions.162  They amount to a self-regulated scheme in which 
the U.S. Federal Trade Commission looks at whether a company, which has 
voluntarily opted-in to the program, fails to do what it has stated it will do, within 
the bounds of its own privacy policy.163  Stronger measures are necessary to restore 
European confidence in U.S. high technology companies. 
 
C.  Establishing Economic Security as National Security 
 
Economic strength as national security, as was previously discussed, is not a 
new concept.  The Founding itself was premised, in part, on the importance of 
economic security as being vital to U.S. national interests.  In 1787, the Articles of 
Confederation were written out of existence on economic security grounds, as the 
country sought to reassure the international community that it was a viable trading 
partner.164  Since that time, the United States has at times had to remind itself of 
the importance of the economy to U.S. national interests.  We are once again at 
such a moment. 
High technology is a vital part of the U.S. economy.  It is a symbolic and 
actual manifestation of the country’s commitment to innovation in every sphere of 
life.  It plays to the United States’ strengths as a nation.  It has the potential to 
change regimes, to alter political relationships, and to shape the daily lives of 
people around the globe.  And it deserves special attention.  The danger is that U.S. 
industry will become less competitive and that the U.S. will lose its dominance in 
the Internet sphere. 
To some extent, we do, structurally, pay some attention to the importance of 
the economy for U.S. national security.  But many consequential decisions are not 
aired in full light of the possible implications for U.S. economic interests.165  One 
way Congress could rectify this would be to take a look at how to integrate 
economic concerns, as an institutional matter, into the national security 
infrastructure—and not just at the highest levels, but at a programmatic level, 
where key decisions about programs are being made. 
 
V.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The Snowden documents revealed not just the extent to which high technology 
companies had been coopted or compromised, but also that the targets of NSA 
162 See, European Parliament resolution of 12 March 2014 on the US NSA surveillance programme, 
surveillance bodies in various Member States and their impact on EU citizens’ fundamental rights 
and on transatlantic cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs (2013/2188(INI)), available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&reference=P7-TA-2014-
0230 (“Takes the view that, as under the current circumstances the Safe Harbour principles do not 
provide adequate protection for EU citizens”). 
163 See Safe Harbor Privacy Principles, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE (July 21, 2000), 
http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/eu/eg_main_018475.asp. 
164 See THE FEDERAL NO. 11 (Alexander Hamilton) (“The speculative trader will at once perceive the 
force of these observations, and will acknowledge that the aggregate balance of the commerce of the 
United States would bid fair to be much more favorable than that of the thirteen States without union 
or with partial unions.” 
165 See In re Google Inc., supra note 142. 
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surveillance include allied and non-allied countries. 166   The impact of this 
information has meant that U.S. companies have lost revenues and experienced 
declining market share.  Simultaneously, the United States’ position in 
international trade negotiations has been weakened.  The NSA programs also 
spurred other countries’ efforts to implement data localization.  Jurisdictional 
questions and national borders previously marked the worldwide Internet 
discussions.167  But countries are using the NSA programs to justify restricting data 
storage to national borders, making it more difficult for the United States to gain 
access.168  The backlash has led some commentators to raise concern that “the 
Internet will never be the same.”169  At risk is the balkanization of the Internet, 
undermining its traditional culture of open access, and increasing the cost of doing 
business.170 
By undermining high technology companies, U.S. economic security—which 
is central to U.S. national security—is at risk.  Part of the problem appears to be 
that the national security institutional structure has failed to adequately reflect the 
importance of economic concerns.  Beyond this, there have been a number of 
unintended consequences even within spheres traditionally understood as within a 
national security realm. 
To redress the negative effects that have followed from public awareness of 
the NSA programs conducted under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act and 
Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act, the most important step that Congress 
could take would be to reign in the surveillance authorities themselves, in the 
process providing greater transparency and oversight.  An alteration in U.S. 
privacy law would also help to reassure U.S. customers and individuals located 
outside domestic bounds that consumer privacy is protected, allowing industry 
accurately to claim that the circumstances have changed.  Consideration of how to 
integrate economic concerns into the national security infrastructure would further 
help to emphasize the importance of taking account of the impact of new initiatives 
on the United States. 
166 See, e.g., Laura Poitras, et al., NSA Spied on European Union Offices, DER SPIEGEL, (June 29, 
2013, 11:21 PM), http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/nsa-spied-on-european-union-offices-a-
908590.html; Laura Poitras, et al., Codename ‘Apalachee’:  How America Spies on Europe and the 
UN, DER SPEIGEL, (Aug. 26, 2013, 11:58 AM) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/secret-nsa-
documents-show-how-the-us-spies-on-europe-and-the-un-a-918625.html; Lana Lam & Stephen 
Chen, EXCUSIVE:  US spies on Chinese Mobile Phone Companies, Steals SMS Data:  Edward 
Snowden, S. CHINA MORNING POST, June 23, 2013, 
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1266821/us-hacks-chinese-mobile-phone-companies-steals-
sms-data-edward-snowden; Lana Lam, US Hacked Pacnet, Asia Pacific Fibre-Optic Network 
Operator, in 2009, S. CHINA MORNING POST (HONG KONG), June 23, 2013, 
http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1266875/exclusive-us-hacked-pacnet-asia-pacific-
fibre-optic-network-operator; Ewen MacAskill & Julian Borger, New NSA Leaks Show How US is 
Bugging its European Allies, THE GUARDIAN (July 1, 2013, 6:28 AM), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/30/nsa-leaks-us-bugging-european-allies. 
167 See, e.g., Kristina Irion, Government Cloud Computing and National Data Sovereignty, 4 POL’Y & 
INTERNET 40 (2012). 
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